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Abstract—Post-hoc explanation techniques refer to a posteriori
methods that can be used to explain how black-box machine
learning models produce their outcomes. Among post-hoc ex-
planation techniques, counterfactual explanations are becoming
one of the most popular methods to achieve this objective. In
particular, in addition to highlighting the most important features
used by the black-box model, they provide users with actionable
explanations in the form of data instances that would have
received a different outcome. Nonetheless, by doing so, they also
leak non-trivial information about the model itself, which raises
privacy issues. In this work, we demonstrate how an adversary
can leverage the information provided by counterfactual expla-
nations to build high-fidelity and high-accuracy model extraction
attacks. More precisely, our attack enables the adversary to build
a faithful copy of a target model by accessing its counterfactual
explanations. The empirical evaluation of the proposed attack on
black-box models trained on real-world datasets demonstrates
that they can achieve high-fidelity and high-accuracy extraction
even under low query budgets.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning (ML) models have become
prevalent in high stake decision-making systems (e.g., credit
scoring [1], predictive justice [2] and hiring [3]). However,
their use is not without any risks as shown by their proven
track record of incorrect decisions having consequential im-
pacts on human lives (e.g., people being wrongly denied
parole [4]). To address these risks, we have witnessed in
the last years an explosion of guidelines – coming from
civil society organizations, the academic world and private
companies – for the ethical development of machine learn-
ing [5], [6]. For instance, to ensure transparency in algorithmic
decision processes, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) has an explicit provision requiring explanations of
the rationale behind decisions of automatic decision-making
systems (among which machine learning is often the key part
as mentioned previously) that have a significant impact on
individuals [7].
Current techniques to achieve transparency include trans-
parent box design and post-hoc explanation of black-box
models [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Transparent box design
aims at building transparent models, which are inherently
interpretable [13], [14], [15], [16]. Examples of such models
include rules sets [17], [18], [19], [13], rule lists [14], [20],
[21], [22], decision trees [15], [23] and scoring systems [24],
[16], [25].
In contrast, post-hoc explanation techniques concern meth-
ods used to explain how black-box models produce their
outcomes [11], [12]. Current families of post-hoc explana-
tions include global explanations, local explanations, feature
relevance explanations, visualization-based explanations and
example-based explanations. In a nutshell, global explanations
break down the whole logic of the black-box model by training
an interpretable surrogate model maximizing its fidelity to the
black-box model. For instance, decision trees can be used to
approximate black-box models [26]. Local explanations aim to
explain a single instance by approximating the black-box in
the neighbourhood of that instance, also using an interpretable
model. Examples of such techniques include LIME [27] and
SHAP [28]. Feature relevance explanations [29], [30] refer to
a broad set of methods that help in understanding the black-
box model through the analysis of inputs’ relative feature
importance. Visualization-based explanations leverage the use
of visualizations to describe the black-box model behavior.
Examples of such techniques include saliency maps [31], [32],
[33] used to explain neural network on image classification
tasks. Finally, example-based explanations focus on explaining
a black-box model by selecting particular data instances to
explain either the behavior of the black-box model or the data
distribution. Examples of this family include prototypes and
criticisms [34] and counterfactual explanations [35], which are
the form of explanations we considered in this work. More
precisely given a black-box model and some input instance,
counterfactual explanations are perturbed versions of the input
instance that will receive a different prediction by the black-
box model.
There exist two fundamental threats to the deployment of
post-hoc explanation techniques in real-world applications.
First, they are subject to explanation manipulations that tar-
get the trustworthiness of machine learning models. Expla-
nation manipulation attacks leverage post-hoc explanations
techniques to give the impression that the black-box model
exhibits some good behavior (e.g., no discrimination) while it
might not be the case [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42],
[43], [44], [45], [46], [47]. For instance, in [38], the authors
have described how it is possible to perform fairwashing
through global and local explanations’ manipulations, which
is the possibility that post-hoc explanation techniques could
be used to provide cover for unfair black-box ML models. In
particular, they showed that, given an unfair black-box model
B, a dishonest model producer could systematically produce
an ensemble of high-fidelity interpretable surrogate models
that are fairer than B according to a predefined notion of
fairness, and use those models to justify that the black-box
model behaves fairly.
Second, post-hoc explanations are vulnerable to inference
attacks that target the privacy of individuals whose records
contributed to the training of machine learning models. In this
type of privacy attack, the adversary leverages explanations
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provided by a machine learning model to infer private infor-
mation such as whether or not a particular individual was part
of the training data through a membership inference attack [48]
or the structure and parameters of the model by performing a
model extraction attack [49].
In this work, we focus on the second type of threat by
demonstrating how an adversary can use counterfactual expla-
nations to conduct powerful model extraction attacks. More
precisely, we make the following contributions:
• We provide the first study of model extraction attacks that
exploit counterfactual explanations.
• We introduce different adversary models in this context,
which differ in terms of (1) the knowledge of the target
model’s training data distribution, (2) the knowledge of
the target model’s architecture and (3) the use of the
training data by the explanation algorithm.
• We study the performances of our attack (i.e., accu-
racy/fidelity of the surrogate model) under these different
adversary models.
• We demonstrate that our attack can achieve high-fidelity
and high-accuracy model extraction under a limited query
budget.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, in Section II,
we review the background notions on machine learning, coun-
terfactual explanations and model extraction attacks. Then, we
present in Section III our method to devise high-fidelity and
high-accuracy model extraction attacks by leveraging coun-
terfactual explanations. Afterwards, in Section IV we report
on the evaluation of our attack on black-box models trained
on real-world datasets before reviewing the related work in
Section V. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures as
well as the tension between privacy and explainability in
Section VI and conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the background notions on
machine learning, counterfactual explanations and model ex-
traction attacks necessary to comprehend our work.
A. Machine learning
A machine learning (ML) model can be defined in a generic
manner as a parameterized function fθ : X → Y , in which
X is the input (or feature) space, Y the output space and θ
the parameters (or weights) of the model. In this work, we
focus on classification tasks within the supervised learning
context [50]. In a classification task, the ML model’s output is
a distribution over |Y| classes. A supervised learning algorithm
aims at building a ML model fθ from a set of labeled data (i.e.,
in which the class associated with a particular data instance is
known a priori), hereinafter referred to as the training data.
More precisely, given a training data Dtrain consisting of a
sample of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) pairs
(xi, yi) ∈ X × Y and a loss function L : Y × Y → R+,
which measures how well the learned model fits the training
data Dtrain, an accurate ML model is found by solving the
following optimization problem:
θˆ = argmin
θ∈Θ
1
|Dtrain|Σ
|Dtrain|
i=1 L(yi, fθ(xi)) + λΩ(θ), (1)
in which Ω(θ) is a regularizer that prevents the ML model from
overfitting its training data while λ controls the strength of the
regularization. This optimization problem is the generic frame-
work used to train ML models such as random forests [51],
decision lists [52] and deep neural networks [53], which
we used in this work. In a deep neural network (DNN),
the function fθ can be structurally viewed as a hierarchical
composition of k parametric function li, for i = 1, . . . , k, in
which each function li corresponds to a layer of neurons [53].
B. Counterfactual explanations
Counterfactual explanations [35], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59],
[60], [61], [62], [63], [64] are data instances that are close to
the input instance to be explained but whose model predictions
are different from that of the input instance. More precisely,
given a black-box model B, an original input x0, its predicted
outcome y0 = B(x0) and a desired outcome y 6= y0, a
counterfactual explanation c(x0) for the input x0 is usually
obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
c(x0) = argmin
c
L(B(c), y) + |c− x0|, (2)
in which L(B(c), y) ensures that the obtained counterfactual
c(x0) has a different prediction from that of the original input
x0 while the second term |c− x0| helps in obtaining a coun-
terfactual close to the original instance. Figure 1 illustrates
a counterfactual explanation scenario while Table I provides
concrete examples of counterfactual explanations obtained on
a real world dataset, namely Adult Income [54].
Diverse counterfactuals. To be more actionable, counter-
factual explanation frameworks often generate for each input
instance, several counterfactuals covering a diverse range of
possibilities instead of the single closest one [35]. Providing
diverse counterfactuals allows users to decide the most effi-
cient way by which they can influence their profile to obtain
the desired outcome. At the same time, on the privacy side,
it also leaks more information to the adversary and enables
him to mount a more powerful attack. In this paper, we rely
on the DiCE framework [63] to implement the explanation
API of the target models. Nonetheless, the proposed attack is
generic enough to work with any counterfactual explanation
framework.
In a nutshell, DiCE aims to find valid and actionable
counterfactual examples by solving the following optimization
problem:
C(x0) = argmin
c1,...,ck
1
kΣ
k
i=1L(B(ci), y) + λ1k Σki=1|ci − x0|
−λ2 dpp diversity(c1, . . . , ck), (3)
in which B is the black-box model, x0 is the original input
to be explained, y 6= B(x0) is the desired outcome, ci is a
counterfactual example and k is the number of counterfactuals
Original input
Original class: Loan denied Desired class: Loan approved
- hours_per_week: 20 -> 45
- education: hs_grad -> masters
- occupation: service -> white_collar
Counterfactual examples
ML model decision’s 
boundary
Fig. 1: Illustration of a counterfactual explanation scenario. Given an original instance for which the model predicts the loan
denied class, a counterfactual explanation framework provides different instances that are close to the original one but belong
to the desired class (loan approved here). An individual asking for an explanation can thus see which aspects of his profile he
may try to change to yield the desired outcome.
Age Workclass Education Marital status Relationship Occupation Race Gender Capital gain Capital loss Hours per week
Original input
(outcome: ≤ 50K) 33 Private Assoc-acdm Married Own-child Professional White Female 0 0 40
Counterfactuals
(outcome: > 50K)
- - Doctorate - - - - - 33703 - 39
- - - - - White-collar - - 99985 4333 -
TABLE I: Examples of counterfactuals obtained on Adult Income [54] dataset. The task is to predict whether an individual
earns more than 50,000$ per year. The top row corresponds to the different features of the input instance. The second row depicts
the data instance to be explained as well as its original outcome. Finally, the last two rows are examples of counterfactuals
generated to explain the original input. Dashed marks refer to features that are unchanged.
to return. The loss function L(B(ci), y) ensures that each of
the counterfactuals has a different outcome than that of the
original input x0 while |ci − x0| leads to the counterfactual
being close to the original input. Finally, dpp diversity(·) is
the diversity metric while λ1 ∈ R+ and λ2 ∈ R+ are the
hyperparameters used to balance the proximity and diversity.
More precisely, the larger λ1 is, the closer the counterfactuals
will be to to the query instance. Similarly, the larger λ2 is, the
more diverse the counterfactuals return will be diverse.
In this paper, we will investigate the success rate of the
attack we propose in both the cases of single and diverse
counterfactuals.
C. Model extraction
A model extraction attack is an inference attack in which
an adversary A obtains a surrogate model SA that is similar
to the targeted model B. The precise meaning of the similarity
depends on the adversary’s objective, while the success of the
attack depends on the adversary’s capabilities.
Adversary objective. Previous works [65], [66] have con-
sidered two main categories of model extraction attacks de-
pending on the goal of the adversary, namely accuracy-
based and fidelity-based model extraction attacks. In accuracy-
based model extraction attacks, also known a theft-motivated
model extraction attacks [66], the adversary aims at learning a
surrogate model SA whose accuracy is as close as possible to
that of the target’s model B. Typically here, model extraction
provides a financial benefit to the adversary as he can use the
surrogate model as a substitute for the commercial API of his
target. In fidelity-based model extraction attacks, also known
as reconnaissance-motivated model extraction attacks [66], the
objective of the adversary is to build a surrogate model SA
maximizing the fidelity with the target’s model B. The fidelity
Fid(SA) of the surrogate is defined as its accuracy relative to
B over a reference set Xr ⊂ X [26]:
Fid(SA) = 1|Xr|
∑
x∈Xr
I(SA(x) = B(x)). (4)
In this context, a model extraction attack is often a first step
towards mounting other attacks such as a model inversion
attacks [67], [68] or adversarial examples discovery [69], [70],
[71].
A particular case of fidelity-based model extraction attack,
known as functionally equivalent extraction, occurs when
the adversary is able to build a surrogate SA matching the
predictions of the target’s model B over the whole input space
(i.e., ∀x ∈ X ,SA(x) = B(x)). As pointed out in [66], func-
tionally equivalent extraction attacks require model-specific
techniques. In contrast, both accuracy-based and fidelity-based
model extraction attacks generally rely on the flexibility of
learning-based approaches, making them more generic. In the
latter case, the target’s model B is used as a labeling oracle
by the adversary.
Adversary capabilities. Following the taxonomy intro-
duced in [66], we describe the adversary capabilities around
three axes, namely the domain knowledge, the deployment
knowledge, and the model access. Domain knowledge cor-
responds to the adversary’s prior information on the task of
the target model. For learning-based approaches, a common
assumption is that the adversary knows as much about the task
as the designer of the target model. Deployment knowledge
refers to the adversary’s knowledge of the target model’s
characteristics (e.g., architecture, training dataset, training
algorithm, hyperparameters, . . . ). Finally, the model access
indicates how the adversary interacts with the target’s model
and the form of information extracted from these interactions.
More precisely, this includes both the number of queries the
adversary is allowed to make to the target’s model and the
type of the model’s output (e.g., labels, probabilities, gradients,
counterfactual explanations,. . . ).
III. MODEL EXTRACTION FROM COUNTERFACTUAL
EXPLANATIONS
In this section, we first frame the generic problem of
explanation-based model extraction before presenting the par-
ticular case of counterfactual explanation, which is the focus
of this work. Afterwards, we describe the different adversar-
ial models investigated in our work before describing their
corresponding model extraction attacks.
A. Problem formulation
As illustrated in Figure 2, in an explanation-based model
extraction attack, the adversary leverages both the predictions
and the explanations of the target model to build the surrogate
model.
Definition 1 (Explanation-based model extraction): Given a
target model B, its prediction API B(·) as well as its explana-
tion API E(·), both available in a black-box setting, a set of
data points x1, . . . , xn, the explanation-based extraction attack
consists in using both the explanations and the predictions of
the target model to build a surrogate SA ≈ B, using an attack
process ψ(·).
In the particular context of counterfactual explanations,
the explanation API E(·) returns for each data point xi its
corresponding counterfactual explanation c(xi) along with its
associated outcome yi. In the case of diverse counterfactuals,
the explanation API will return a set C(xi) of counterfactual
examples instead of a single one.
B. Attack description
Adversary model. We are interested in a fidelity-based
extraction attack (also called reconnaissance-motivated extrac-
tion attack) in which the adversary A will rely on both the
predictions and the counterfactual explanations of the target
model to conduct his attack. Similarly to [66], we will assume
that the adversary knows as much about the task as the
designer of the target model in terms of domain knowledge.
As for the model access, the adversary will have black-box
access to the target model’s predictions and counterfactual
explanations. We also assume a bound on the number of
queries that the adversary is allowed to make. Each query to
the explanation API E(·) returns one or more counterfactual
explanations depending on the diversity criteria. Finally, for
the deployment knowledge, we consider different scenarios
according to (1) the knowledge of the training data distribu-
tion, which can be known, partially known (e.g., knowledge
of the marginal distribution) or unknown, (2) the knowledge
of the target model architecture (known or unknown), and (3)
the use of the training data by the explanation algorithm (used
or unused).
Attack strategy. To conduct his attack, the adversary first
builds his attack set DA according to his knowledge of the
distribution of the target model’s training data. Then, for each
data point x ∈ DA, he sends a query to both the prediction API
B(·) and the explanation API E(·) of the target model. Finally,
A trains the surrogate model SA according to his knowledge
of the target model’s architecture, by using a transfer set TA =
{DA,B(DA)} ∪ E(DA) consisting of both the outputs of the
prediction and explanation APIs.
In traditional model extraction attacks, the transfer set
TA of the adversary can be imbalanced due to the unequal
distribution of classes within the dataset. As a result, there may
be a significant difference between the class-based accuracy
of the surrogate model SA and the target model B [65]. In
contrast, counterfactual explanations-based model extractions
attack do not suffer from such limitations as the attack set is
balanced by construction since each instance is followed by
its corresponding counterfactual explanation. As illustrated in
Figure 3, the surrogate models of the adversary can better ap-
proximate the decision boundary of the target model with few
queries in the counterfactual-based model extraction attacks
compared to traditional model extraction ones.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we report on the performances of coun-
terfactual explanations-based model extraction attacks when
evaluated on real datasets.
A. Experimental setting
Datasets. We have conducted our experiments on three pub-
lic datasets that are extensively used in the FaccT (Fairness,
Accountability, and Transparency) literature, namely Adult
Income [54], COMPAS [72] and Default Credit [54]. In a
nutshell, the Adult Income dataset contains information about
individuals collected from the 1994 U.S. census. The dataset
contains 48,842 individuals, each described by 11 attributes.
The underlying classification task is to predict whether or not
an individual makes more than 50,000$ per year in terms of
income. The COMPAS dataset gathers records from crimi-
nal offenders in Florida during 2013 and 2014. The dataset
contains 7,214 individuals, each described by 8 attributes.
Fig. 2: Illustration of a traditional model extraction attack and an explanation-based model extraction. In the former, the
adversary relies on the predictions B(x1), . . . ,B(xn) of the target model B to build the surrogate model SA using a process
ψ(·), while in the later, the adversary combines the predictions B(x1), . . . ,B(xn) and the explanations E(x1), . . . , E(xn) of
the target model B to generate the surrogate SA using another process ψ′(·).
(a) Tradition model extraction
with 8059 queries
(b) Counterfactual-based
model extraction with 100
queries.
(c) Counterfactual-based model
extraction with 500 queries.
(d) Counterfactual-based
model extraction with 1000
queries.
Fig. 3: Decision boundary of the surrogate model on Adult Income dataset [54].
The classification task considered is to predict whether a
subject will re-offend within two years after being released.
Finally, the Default Credit dataset is composed of information
on Taiwanese credit card users. The dataset contains 29,986
individuals, each described by 23 attributes, while the classi-
fication task is to predict whether a user will default in his
payments.
Evaluation metrics. Our main objective is to conduct a
reconnaissance-motivated model extraction attack. As such, we
will use the fidelity metric, as described in Section II-C, as
our primary evaluation metric for the success of the attack.
Nonetheless, we will also report on the accuracy of the
surrogate.
Black-box models. Each dataset is split into three subsets,
namely the training sets (67%), the testing sets (16.5%), and
the attack pools (16.5%). The black-box models are learned
on the training sets. The testing sets are used to evaluate
(1) the accuracy of both black-box models and surrogates
models and (2) the fidelity of the surrogate model relative
to the target black-box model. The attack pools are used only
for the scenario in which the adversary is assumed to know
the data distribution. For both Adult Income and COMPAS,
the target models are Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) with
two hidden layers, with respectively 75 and 50 neurons. For
Default Credit, the target model is a MLP with one hidden
layer of 50 neurons.
For all the three target models, we have used the L1
regularization (with λ = 0.001), the RMSprop optimizer [73],
the rectifier activation function (ReLu) for hidden layers, the
Sigmoid activation function for output layers and train the
models for 100 epochs. Table II summarizes the accuracy of
the three black-box models on their training and test sets.
Scenarios investigated. The adversary model presented in
Section III-B leads us to consider five different counterfactual-
Dataset Training Set Test Set
Adult Income 85.36 84.70
COMPAS 69.00 66.30
Default Credit 81.10 80.70
TABLE II: Performances of the black-box models. Columns
report the accuracy of the black-box models on their training
set and test set.
based model extraction scenarios, namely (S1) single coun-
terfactual with known training data distribution, (S2) single
counterfactual with partially known training data distribution,
(S3) single counterfactual with unknown training data distri-
bution, (S4) multiple counterfactuals with known training data
distribution and (S5) impact of the proximity and diversity
metrics on the performances of the model extraction. The
first three scenarios are variants of the same setting in which
the explanation API only provides a single counterfactual
explanation per query, but under different assumptions on the
adversary knowledge on the distribution of the training data
of the target model. The objective of the last two scenarios
is to study the impact on the success rate of the extraction
attack of having access to multiple and diverse counterfactual
explanations per query.
For all five scenarios, the performances are evaluated ac-
cording to the adversary’s knowledge on the architecture of
the target model and whether or not the explanation API
uses the training data. When the adversary does not know
the target model’s architecture, we imagine that typically the
adversary will have a trial-and-error strategy in which different
architectures will be tried with the one maximizing the fidelity
of the surrogate being kept at the end. In our experiments, we
simulate this situation with an adversary that tries 5 different
architectures, which we describe in Table III. Remark that
since the surrogate training is done offline once the transfer set
has been built, the adversary is only limited in its exploration
by its computational resources and the time he is willing
to dedicate to this exploration. In particular, if he has the
sufficient resources, he might even use advanced techniques
for exploring the space of possible architectures such as
Neural Architecture Search [74] to maximize the fidelity of
the surrogate model.
Hereafter, we detail each of the five scenarios.
(S1) Single counterfactual with known training data
distribution. In this scenario, the adversary directly uses
the attack pool as his attack set DA. More precisely, he
selects a subset QA of DA to query the target model and
construct his transfer set TA = {QA,B(QA)}∪E(QA). In the
experiments conducted, we have considered different values
|QA| ∈ {100, 250, 500, 1000} for the number of queries to
study its effect on the attack’s performance. For each value
of |QA|, the experiment is repeated over 10 random sampling
of QA and the average fidelity and accuracy of the surrogate
are reported. Additionally, we compare the performances of
the surrogate with a baseline model trained using the complete
attack pool DA and the predictions B(DA) of the target model.
(S2) Single counterfactual with partially known training
data distribution. Here, the adversary is assumed to know the
marginal distribution of the attributes of the training set. To
perform his attack, in this scenario, the adversary builds an
attack set DA, composed of data points sampled according
to the marginal distribution of the attributes. The rest of the
attack is similar to the process described above for (S1).
(S3) Single counterfactual with unknown training data
distribution. This scenario is similar to (S2) except that the
distribution of the training data of the target model is unknown.
As a consequence, the attack set DA is generated simply by
uniformly sampling data points from the input space. Clearly,
this can sometimes lead to the generation of unrealistic data
points.
(S4) Multiple counterfactuals with known training data
distribution. In this scenario, the same configuration used
in (S1) is considered, but the number k of counterfactuals
provided by the explanation API is increased. More precisely,
the attack performances are studied for k in the range {3, 5, 7}.
For each of these settings, the default values for the proximity
and diversity hyperparameters are used (i.e., λ1 = 0.5 and
λ2 = 1.0).
(S5) Impact of the proximity and diversity on the
performances of the model extraction. In this scenario, the
impact of proximity and diversity on the surrogate model’s
performance is explored. For the sake of simplicity, we fo-
cus on the setting in which the adversary knows the data
distribution and the training data is used by the explanation
API since the results are similar in both cases. We set
|QA| = 1000, k = 5, λ1 ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0} and
λ2 ∈ {1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0}.
All our experiments were run on an Intel Core i7 (2.90
GHz, 16GB of RAM) laptop. We provide a software im-
plementation to reproduce the results of our experiments at
https://github.com/aivodji/mrce.
B. Experimental results
(S1) Single counterfactual with known training data
distribution. Table IV summarizes the results obtained for
scenario (S1). The attack is evaluated on Adult Income,
COMPAS and Default Credit datasets. Overall, for all these
three datasets, we observe that with only 250 queries, our
attack reaches a fidelity of 90%. This fidelity is higher than
that of the baseline, which is a traditional model extraction
attack with 8059 queries for Adult Income, 1192 queries
for COMPAS and 4948 queries for Default Credit. We also
observed that as the number of queries increases, both the
fidelity and the accuracy of the surrogate also improve. With
only 1000 queries, our attack already reaches a fidelity of
94% on Adult Income, 93% on COMPAS and 98% on Default
Credit and an accuracy matching that of the target model (as
measured on its test set) on all three datasets. Moreover, an
interesting finding of our study is that the knowledge of the
target model architecture and the use of the training data by
the explanation API does not lead to a significant advantage
with respect to the attack’s success.
Hidden layers Hidden activation Output activation Loss Optimizer Regularizer Epochs
Arch 1 100, 50 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy RMSprop L1(0.001) 100
Arch 2 100, 50 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy Adam L1(0.01) 20
Arch 3 200, 100, 50, 25 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy RMSprop L1(0.01) 20
Arch 4 200, 100, 50, 25 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy Adam L1(0.01) 20
Arch 5 100, 75, 50 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy RMSprop L1(0.001) 100
Arch 6 100, 75, 50 ReLu Sigmoid Binary cross-entropy Adam L1(0.01) 20
TABLE III: Architectures of the models used across the experiments. For both Adult Income and COMPAS datasets, we use
Arch 5 as the target model architecture, the adversary uses the remaining architectures as candidate architectures when the
target model architecture is unknown. For the Default Credit dataset, Arch 1 is used as the target model architecture and the
remaining when the target model architecture is unknown.
Dataset Target modelArchitecture
Training data used
by E(·)
100 Queries 250 Queries 500 Queries 1000 Queries BaselineModel
Adult Income
known yes 89.02/81.05 92.06/82.94 93.21/83.26 94.22/83.68 81.28/76.06no 89.39/81.47 91.78/82.87 92.17/82.74 94.84/83.88
unknown yes 89.27/81.11 92.42/83.18 93.62/83.52 94.65/83.88 81.28/76.06no 88.99/81.24 92.21/83.05 93.40/83.28 94.89/83.97
COMPAS
known yes 87.13/66.19 91.29/67.30 92.17/67.11 92.85/66.97 71.42/61.09no 87.91/65.81 89.57/65.86 92.62/66.49 93.92/66.50
unknown yes 88.13/66.50 90.81/67.26 92.00/67.16 92.36/66.90 85.04/64.95no 89.12/66.16 90.08/66.03 92.91/66.66 93.43/66.49
Default Credit
known yes 97.09/80.22 97.93/80.55 98.31/80.63 98.57/80.52 88.52/77.86no 97.15/80.20 97.77/80.34 97.77/80.34 98.28/80.48
unknown yes 97.08/80.12 97.99/80.57 98.39/80.58 98.39/80.58 88.52/77.86no 96.90/80.15 97.52/80.38 97.90/80.4 98.03/80.43
TABLE IV: Performances (fidelity/accuracy) of the model extraction attack in scenario (S1) for Adult Income, COMPAS, and
Default Credit datasets. For each of the query scenarios, we report on the performances (averaged over 10 extraction attacks)
of the surrogate model. The column of the baseline model correspond to the fidelity/accuracy of the surrogate model obtained
using the whole attack pool DA to conduct a traditional model extraction attack.
(S2) Single counterfactual with partially known training
data distribution. Table V displays the results obtained for
scenario (S2). Here, for the sake of simplicity, we have only
performed the experiments on the Adult Income dataset. The
results demonstrate that an adversary who only knows the
features’ marginal distribution can still perform a powerful
model extraction attack. In particular, with 1000 queries, the
surrogate model SA still reaches a fidelity of 93% and an
accuracy close to that of the target model on the test set.
(S3) Single counterfactual with unknown training data
distribution. Table VI describes the performance of our attack
for scenario (S3). Similarly to (S2), we focus on the Adult
Income dataset. Overall, the results show that even without
knowing the data. distribution, the adversary can build a
surrogate model performing better than the one obtained using
a traditional extraction attack with 8× more labels and with
full knowledge of the data distribution. However, compared
to the fidelity of counterfactual-based extraction attacks with
partial knowledge (respectively full knowledge) of the data
distribution, the surrogate’s fidelity decreases by 7.79% (re-
spectively 9.14%).
(S4) Multiple counterfactuals with known training data
distribution. Figure 4 describes the impact of the number of
counterfactuals provided for each query on the performance of
the extraction attack. Overall, we can observe that the fidelity
of the surrogate improves as the number of counterfactuals
increases. Besides, the performances of the surrogate model
when the adversary does not use the architecture of the
target model (Figures 4c and 4d) are slightly better than
the performances of the surrogates trained using the same
architecture as the target model (Figures 4a and 4b). These
results also corroborate our previous findings that the target
model architecture’s knowledge does not provide a significant
advantage to the adversary. Note that if the training data is
used by the explanation API, this seems to give the adversary
a small advantage in the lower query budget regime (|QA| ≤
500). However, in higher query budget regimes (|QA| > 500),
it does not provide a significant advantage to the adversary.
(S5) Impact of proximity and diversity on the perfor-
mance of the model extraction attack. Figure 5 summarizes
the results obtained for scenario (S5) on the Adult Income
dataset. Overall, the higher we set the constraints, the more
Dataset Target modelArchitecture
Training data used
by E(·)
100 Queries 250 Queries 500 Queries 1000 Queries
Adult Income
known yes 86.19/79.47 89.05/81.37 91.70/82.84 92.95/83.30no 86.48/79.82 89.54/81.77 91.74/82.84 92.60/83.20
unknown yes 86.22/79.46 90.01/81.84 92.14/83.12 92.97/83.4no 86.22/79.83 90.02/81.94 92.13/83.09 93.54/83.65
TABLE V: Performances (fidelity/accuracy) of the model extraction attack in scenario (S2) for Adult Income. For each of the
query scenarios, we report on the performances (averaged over 10 extraction attacks) of the surrogate model.
Dataset Target modelArchitecture
Training data used
by E(·)
100 Queries 250 Queries 500 Queries 1000 Queries
Adult Income
known yes 82.30/75.90 83.28/77.12 84.46/78.25 85.06/78.58no 82.31/76.11 82.63/76.78 83.74/77.57 83.74/77.57
unknown yes 81.98/75.48 84.31/77.38 85.75/78.79 85.75/78.79no 81.58/75.59 83.37/77.15 84.60/78.28 84.61/78.25
TABLE VI: Performances (fidelity/accuracy) of the model extraction attack in scenario (S3) for Adult Income. For each of
the query scenarios, we report on the performances (averaged over 10 extraction attacks) of the surrogate model.
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Fig. 4: Performances (i.e., fidelity) of the model extraction attack in scenario (S4) for Adult Income. Results demonstrate the
impact of the number of counterfactual explanations per query on the extraction attack’s fidelity.
likely the surrogate found will be of high fidelity. Similar to
our previous observations, the knowledge of the target model
architecture does not provide a significant advantage.
Summary of the results. Consistently across the experi-
ments, we have observed that counterfactual explanations can
be leveraged by an adversary with a limited query budget
to perform high-fidelity and high-accuracy model extractions.
In particular, when the adversary has partial or complete
knowledge of the data distribution, he can obtain a high-
fidelity and a high-accuracy surrogate with only 500 queries. In
contrast, when the data distribution is unknown, the surrogate
performances are lower as expected. However, even in this
restricted setting, the surrogate obtained with our attack still
performs better than the surrogate generated using traditional
model extraction attacks with full knowledge of the data
distribution. Additionally, experiments with multiple and di-
verse counterfactuals demonstrate that this requirement leads
to better performances of the model extraction attacks.
V. RELATED WORK
As mentioned previously, model extraction attacks have
been successfully conducted with the goal of obtaining high-
accuracy and/or high-fidelity surrogates [75], [49], [76], [77],
[71], [78], [66] as well as with the objective to build
functionally-equivalent surrogates [79], [75], [80], [49], [81],
[66].
Most of the previous works aiming to build high-accuracy
or high-fidelity surrogates usually rely on learning-based ap-
proaches. In this form of attack, the target model is used
as an oracle to create a labelled dataset, which is then used
as training data for the surrogates. Different learning-based
approaches have been used, ranging from non-adaptive tech-
niques (i.e., queries are sent independently from each other)
as in [75], [77], [49] to more advanced ones such as active
learning [82] as in [75], [71], [76], [81] or semi-supervised
learning [83] as in [66]. Our work falls into the first category as
our attacks do not rely on adaptive techniques, which means,
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Fig. 5: Performances (fidelity) of the model extraction attack in scenario (S5) for Adult Income dataset. The results show the
impact of the proximity and the diversity metrics on the fidelity of the surrogate.
for instance, that all our queries could be sent at once in a
batch. Despite being non-interactive, our attacks lead to high-
fidelity and high-accuracy surrogates with low query budgets.
Functionally-equivalent model extraction attacks often rely
on equation-solving approaches [75], [66], in which the ad-
versary solves a system of equations modeling the unknown
parameters of the target model to retrieve its weights. Ad-
vances techniques such as the use of power side-channel
attacks [80] and gradients-based explanations [49] have been
used to improve the performances of functionally-equivalent
model extraction attacks.
In addition, hybrid approaches [66] combining functionally-
equivalent attacks and learning-based attacks have been used
to improve the overall performance of the surrogate model.
Usually, these approaches first fix some unknown model
parameters to the values obtained through a functionally-
equivalent attack to reduce the number of free variables
before training a surrogate through a learning-based attack
by leveraging the parameters extracted during the first phase.
Other works have investigated how to improve the deployment
knowledge of the adversary such as [84], in which the authors
propose an attack to steal the hyperparameters of black-box
models and [85], in which the authors have designed attacks
to infer the architecture as well as training hyperparameters of
black-box ML models.
With respect to designing model extraction attacks that
leverage explanations provided by the model, to the best of our
knowledge, there exists currently only one work [49] (which
does not rely at all on counterfactual explanations). In this
seminal paper, the authors demonstrated that an adversary
could perform a model extraction attack by relying on the
target model’s gradient explanations. Gradient explanations are
used in visualization-based explanation techniques [32], [33]
to highlight parts of an image that lead to the decision of
the target model. However, they are challenging to interpret
in prediction problems involving tabular data, which are the
setting in which we focus on in this paper. In addition, our
technique is agnostic to the architecture of the target model,
while the attack in [49] is designed for a special family of
models, namely 2-layer neural networks.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the possible countermeasures
that could be deployed to mitigate our attacks as well as the
inherent existing tension between the two requirements that
are privacy and explainability.
Countermeasures. Protection mechanisms against model
extraction can be categorized into two categories: defenses that
aim to prevent theft-motivated model extraction attacks and
those that can be used to prevent the adversary from learning a
high-fidelity surrogate. In the former case, since the adversary
is motivated by stealing the model for its own benefit (e.g., by
deploying it as a MLAAS), he can be deterred to do so through
defenses techniques mainly based on embedding watermarks
in the surrogate model [86], [87], [88]. Such watermarks can
then be detected if the adversary later makes the surrogate
model publicly available for queries. However, watermark-
based techniques are inefficient against adversaries that use
stolen models internally.
For the prevention of high-fidelity model extraction attacks,
the defense mechanisms proposed usually rely on query mon-
itoring and auditing techniques that analyze the query pattern
to distinguish normal users from adversaries [89], [90], [65].
However, such approaches will be inefficient against non-
adaptive attacks that work with low query budgets, such as
the attack we proposed, because it will be very difficult to
distinguish adversarial queries from the ones made by regular
users. In addition, an adversary can always perform a Sybil
attack in which he creates multiple accounts under different
identities, before sharing his queries among these “regular”-
looking users to avoid detection.
Tension between privacy and explainability. Post-hoc
explanation techniques are often presented as a way to fulfill
two distinct objectives. On the one hand, they can be used
as debugging tools to inform experts such as data scientists
or machine learning researchers on the behavior of their
black-box models. On the other hand, they can be used as
justification to explain the outcomes of deployed black-box
models to the end users [91]. The requirements that are asked
from post-hoc explanations are very different depending on
which of these two settings is considered. For instance, to be
acceptable in the second context, post-hoc explanations need
to be realistic by satisfying criteria such as robustness and
diversity. At the same time, the more realistic they become,
the more information they will leak about the black-box model
they are explaining, which will lead to more powerful attacks.
In particular, our paper demonstrates how an adversary can
leverage counterfactual explanations to devise high-fidelity
and high-accuracy model extraction attacks. In addition, the
performances of the surrogate models can only increase as
post-hoc explanations get more realistic. Thus, we believe that
often there will be a trade-off to set between the realism
of explanations and the privacy protection that we aim at
achieving against model extraction or other privacy attacks
on machine learning models.
A recent work has suggested the use of differential pri-
vacy [92], [93] in the design of post-hoc explanations [94].
However, the impact of differential privacy on the robustness
of the explanations and the trust we can have on differentially-
private explanations remains an open question. For high-stake
decision systems, it seems that the safer solution would be
to directly design an inherently transparent models built in a
privacy-preserving way by using techniques such as model-
agnostic private learning [95], [96].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated counterfactual
explanations-based model extraction attacks in five different
adversarial scenarios. In particular, we have demonstrated
that an adversary can exploit counterfactual explanations to
conduct high-fidelity and high-accuracy learning-based model
extraction attacks even under low query budgets. Furthermore,
if the counterfactual explanations provided are required to
be diverse to increase the trust in the explanations provided,
then this directly improves the performances of the surrogate
models learnt by our attacks.
As shown by previous works on fairwashing [38], [39], [46],
post-hoc explanations techniques are vulnerable to explanation
manipulations since they can be unfaithful to the black-box
model they are explaining (e.g., by giving the impression that
the model is fair while it is not the case). On the other hand,
our work demonstrates that the more faithful ML models get,
the more powerful are the model extraction attacks that an
adversary can perform. Future work will investigate the use
of privacy-preserving transparent box design as a solution to
solve the tension between privacy and explainability.
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